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OFFICE
of the
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)

1 July 1955 - 30 December 1955

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON WARTIME PREPARATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director for
Planning and Coordination

SUBJECT : Semi-Annual Report on Wartime Preparation
by the Elements of the DD/S

REFERENCE : Memorandum from the DCI, subject: "Wartime
Mission of CIA," dated 2 June 1955

INTRODUCTION

1. As in the initial report on wartime preparations, this report discusses separately the progress, plans and problems of the DD/S elements relative to:

a. The evacuation of CIA Headquarters, the redeployment of headquarters personnel to the Emergency Relocation Center, and the activation and continuing support of the emergency headquarters as a functioning headquarters (referred to hereafter as "Headquarters Wartime Preparations").

b. Preparations and plans for the satisfaction of the wartime logistical and functional support requirements of clandestine operations overseas (referred to hereafter as "Overseas Wartime Preparations").

2. In recognition of the fact that each of the support elements of the DD/S has a distinctly different staff or functional responsibility relative to wartime preparation, an individual report from each of these elements is attached hereto for detailed study if desired. This covering report, therefore, will only attempt to summarize the overall progress, plans and problems presented in the individual reports. In reporting in this manner, it should not be assumed that I concur with individual recommendations and analyses of problems contained in the individual reports. Rather, I have analyzed these recommendations to uncover areas wherein there may be further need for Agency policy determinations, wartime planning assumptions or more effective direction in order that all Agency components concerned can work in unison and coordination toward the achievement of a balanced level of wartime preparedness.

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HEADQUARTERS WARTIME PREPARATIONS

1. CIA is an active participant in the emergency and civil defense planning of the Executive Branch of the Government. Accordingly, the Agency Emergency Relocation Plan has been developed and has been continuously modified to reflect current Executive, Federal Civil Defense and Office of Defense Mobilization planning assumptions and policies. The present plan provides for the evacuation of Headquarters, the initial redeployment of [] specifically identified key persons to the emergency headquarters [] and the augmentation after the hostilities have begun of this force from the remainder of the headquarters personnel contacted through registration points established beyond the perimeter of the target area of Washington.

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2. On 17 August 1955 a revision of Agency Notice [] was published designating new registration points to which surviving employees (not members of the initial relocation force) would report for further assignment after an enemy attack. This was done to move the registration points beyond the area of destruction in the light of technical developments and presumed increased enemy capabilities.

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3. A new set of instructions for assembling the emergency force is in process of publication. These instructions are designed to bring earlier procedures into line with recently established doctrines and policies of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Executive Branch of the Government in general.

4. During "Operation Alert 1955" the CIA Emergency Planning Officer made a careful study as to the adequacy of the emergency headquarters and its facilities. Similarly, each of the support elements appraised its capability to perform essential support functions with the staff, records, and facilities at hand. As a result thereof, plans have been revised and positive action has been taken to correct or alleviate major deficiencies. The detached reports of the Chiefs of support offices and staffs reveal the full range of action being taken. Major activities in the area of Headquarters Wartime Preparations are summarized hereunder:

A. The Director of Logistics, in coordination with the Director of Communications, is progressing with a survey of the [] leading to the development of plans for expansion of existing facilities or, if circumstances warrant, for new construction. This is being done on a tentative basis but is designed to be as thorough as possible in the absence of firm guidance as to the detailed mission of the Agency under emergency relocation circumstances and of the manner in which that mission and its resultant functions would be broken down among the various organizational

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units. Along with this survey they are making a study to determine potential water, power, heating, sewage disposal and fire protection capabilities available to insure that there is adequate preparation for whatever expansion might take place at the Center. A survey has been made of potential private billeting facilities available within

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B. The Director of Logistics previously had studied the emergency needs for printing and reproduction facilities at the Center. The conclusions of that study remain unchanged at the present time in the absence of firm guidance as to the emergency mission and the requirements which would be engendered thereby. He has restated the results of this survey and the funds entailed therein along with those of additional generator requirements in his detailed report attached hereto. In addition to the surveys described above, the Director of Logistics also is undertaking to make a determination of the increased amounts and types of office and business machines and of transportation and courier facilities which would be required under emergency circumstances, and he is drawing plans designed to effect his assumption of responsibility for the maintenance and physical operation of the Center as the Agency headquarters after relocation takes place.

C. The Director of Personnel, within the limitations imposed by the lack of clarification of the nature and magnitude of CIA activities in wartime, has undertaken a projection of post-hostilities manpower requirements by number, type and rank, both military and civilian. In this connection, he is developing working agreements with the Department of Defense as regards military personnel and has under study the question of creation of a civilian reserve corps.

D. The Chief of the Medical Staff has studied and delineated his wartime responsibilities and is making studies and is taking action to ensure their fulfillment. Specifically, he has re-analyzed the problem of decontamination of emergency force personnel and equipment exposed to the effects of radiation, as a consequence of which the old plan for setting up and operating a decontamination facility [redacted] has been abandoned in favor of a plan for doing the decontamination work [redacted] He is, accordingly, revising the plans along these lines. In addition, he is working in collaboration with the Director of Logistics and the Director of Communications to ensure that their plans provide for the maintenance of adequate medical standards and adequate service for the health and medical aid for members of the emergency relocation force.

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E. The Director of Communications, in addition to his participation in the surveys mentioned above and in addition to maintaining continuous study and review of the problems incident to operation of the emergency communications facilities, has been negotiating with the Chief Signal Officer of the Army and with the White House Signal Agency relative to the over-all plan of the sensitive agencies of government for centralized net control and for transfer of certain communications equipment as an incident thereto.

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5. In response to a survey by a task force of the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Sub-Committee of the National Security Council, as to the vulnerability of government relocation sites to sabotage and espionage, the physical security arrangements of [] have been reviewed and have been accepted as being effective.

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6. Considerable progress has been noted by the Records Management Division regarding the storing of vital materials in the vault at []. There is a greater sense of awareness on the part of operating officials throughout the Agency of the importance and necessity of having their vital documents available at the Center, which is attributable in part to the lessons learned during Operation Alert in 1955 and in part to the carrying on of the established programs by the Records Management Division directed toward this end.

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7. The Office of Defense Mobilization at our instigation has commenced planning for an over-all interagency courier service and is coordinating the undertakings of the various governmental agencies, especially the sensitive security agencies, to perfect liaison arrangements under relocation circumstances.

8. An investigation was made in collaboration with the Director of Security and the Director of Logistics into the services which could be made available to this Agency by the General Services Administration and the District of Columbia Civil Defense authorities locally in event of emergency. All aspects of this problem were studied with officials of those two organizations with the resulting conclusion that their services and facilities are adequate to supplement our own plans and capabilities.

9. My review of our present status with respect to preparedness to continue CIA's headquarters functions in time of war leads to the following conclusions:

A. That CIA's preparations and plans are well-advanced and that within the guidelines laid down for the security agencies of the Government, CIA has in being an emergency headquarters facility which could be immediately activated with no greater confusion and deficiency than would be normal at this stage in the overall emergency planning of the Government.

B. That there are three major problems which must be resolved (at least tentatively) before there can be much further improvement in the physical and functional preparedness of CIA's wartime headquarters. These are:

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(1) CIA does not yet have an adequately firm concept of its wartime mission or, if it does, this mission has not been analyzed as to the essential functions which will be carried out in wartime at CIA's headquarters. Until this is done it is not possible to forecast with reasonable accuracy the manpower, records, physical facilities and supporting services which will be required at the emergency headquarters, yet such analyses are essential to the planned, orderly and economical development of a fully functional emergency headquarters.

(2) The uncertainty as to the location and availability date of the permanent CIA headquarters is a retardant factor in planning and providing for established needs for increased facilities at the present emergency headquarters. Our policy to date has been to maintain our emergency headquarters to the maximum extent as a functional activity in support of current activities. By this means, CIA not only minimizes preparedness costs but is assured that its emergency facilities are truly functional. Depending upon the ultimate placement of CIA's permanent headquarters, it may or may not be desirable to expand the present emergency headquarters or to improve its physical facilities.

(3) That the Executive agencies of the Government will continue to be called upon to participate in periodic exercises to test and develop their capability to function under wartime conditions. These exercises will inevitably require greater integration of the activities of the DD/I, DD/P and DD/S as well as those of other related agencies. The problem, therefore, is that CIA has no coordinator or coordinating mechanism to organize, direct and supervise such exercises.

10. The problems raised in 9.B. above are clearly Agency problems and require joint and concurrent action by the DD/I, DD/P and DD/S. There appears, therefore, to be a need for a suitable method to unite the three major components in the study and solution of common or interrelated problems involved in achieving an adequate degree of headquarters wartime preparedness. This could be done if a designee of the Director were given this overall coordinating responsibility. Alternatively, a committee or task force could be created by directive to isolate and study problems caused by policy voids, obscurity of concepts or lack of coordination and thereby achieve the needed impetus and unity. It is my recommendation that the task force mechanism be at least tested.

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OVERSEAS WARTIME PREPARATIONS

1. For purposes of this report and future reports on the plans, progress and problems in preparation for war, it is highly desirable to define and analyze the responsibilities of the support components and to understand the course of action necessary in the development of a state of wartime preparedness. There can be little doubt but that the support components have a major responsibility in planning and preparing for wartime. It is my opinion that the major asset which CIA can bring into wartime operations is its know-how relative to the development, conduct, support and administration of clandestine activities. This basic know-how must be adaptable to changes in the type and magnitude of the clandestine operations called for in wartime, must be capable of immediate implementation and rapid expansion as the military and national situation dictates.

2. If the above analysis is reasonably correct, pre-established and realistic concepts of wartime organization, basing, mobilization, training, security and all forms of logistical support are the sine qua non to wartime preparedness. In all of these areas the support components have either a significant or predominant interest and responsibility which is inseparable from their current peacetime responsibilities, which are as follow:

A. To perform support services and provide technical guidance on support matters directly to all operational components.

B. To exercise technical supervision over all support functions and services obtained by operational components from non-CIA sources.

C. To exercise technical administration over the composite support system represented in A. and B. above.

3. The effect of war upon the established peacetime support and administrative system will be so great that only a carefully developed plan in being will permit effective transition from the peacetime support and administrative system to a wartime system. In peacetime the bulk of the direct support and administrative guidance of clandestine operations is furnished by support components at headquarters. Our personnel (mobilization), security, training and logistical functions and other support and administrative activities are preponderantly carried out at headquarters. In wartime, however, our support and administrative requirements are not only immediately altered in nature but a major portion of them must be capable of accomplishment in the field by CIA operating components relying, of course, upon the military for primary logistical support.

4. The support components of CIA accordingly have a dual planning and preparatory responsibility. They not only must prepare to adjust their established ways and means for accomplishing their support and technical administrative responsibilities at headquarters but must ensure that the support and administrative concepts and plans incorporated in the overseas war plans of CIA are comprehensive, practical and ready for implementation.

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5. The lengthy preceding introduction is essential to reporting on the plans, progress and problems of the support components relative to wartime preparations. The details of our activities to date are contained in the reports of the individual support components attached hereto. In a more general and objective presentation our status is as follows:

A. Each of the support components has acknowledged war planning as a continuing and important assignment. Individuals have been designated on the planning staffs of each component as war planners and these persons have been or are being trained in the war planning system developed by the DD/P and in the basic concepts and principles which have been or are being developed between CIA and the Department of Defense. Significant progress, therefore, has been made in the development of planning competence.

B. In recognition that there are six major support components whose planning activities must be closely integrated not only among themselves but with those of the DD/P, I have created the nucleus of an overall DD/S planning staff to generally guide and correlate the planning activities of the several support components.

C. With this as yet not fully-developed mechanism, we have been participating more effectively and to an ever-increasing degree with the War Plans Division of PPC Staff, DD/P, in development of the formal war plans of the Agency as related to JCS and Theater Commander war plans. Inasmuch as basic concepts as to CIA's wartime functions and CIA's wartime relationships with the military have been slow and difficult to formulate, those portions of war plans which really signify plans, agreements and procedures for the support and administration of CIA's wartime activities overseas have not as yet been developed.

D. Notwithstanding the impediment of these as yet not fully-developed concepts and plans, the individual support components have for the most part recognized and defined their major problems in ensuring the continuity of their support and administrative functions in the wartime transition. The Offices of Personnel, Logistics and Communications, in particular, have clearly defined wartime direct support responsibilities which are so closely related to their peacetime functions that they are susceptible to current study, planning and preparatory action. Other support components whose functions are more concerned with intangible services and technical guidance are necessarily held back pending clarification of basic concepts of CIA's wartime mission and the advanced development of implementing war plans. The details of our plans, progress and problems in this area of war planning are reflected in the individual reports attached hereto.

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6. My review of these reports and discussions with my principal planning assistant indicates the possible need for extensive review and possibly a reorientation of the Agency's war planning and preparedness activities. The following listing presents problems and views which have been reflected to me:

A. The war planning efforts of the Agency are excessively concerned with the development of formal war planning documents which are acceptable to both CIA and the Department of Defense. Past philosophy of war planning appears to be that support planning is not called for until in the normal course of time, a call is made for formal support annexes to the basic documents. As a result of this approach, insufficient effort has been made to ensure that support components participate in war planning. Although there has been much improvement lately, a great deal more needs to be done to see that support war planners are furnished the information necessary to fully understand the concepts of operations and the current status of war planning. Effective support planning will continue to be seriously retarded until this is done.

B. There does not appear to be within CIA a concept of CIA's overseas wartime function which is sufficiently official that all components involved in planning can accept it as a basis for planning. A review of the slow and controversial development of CIA's war activities concepts indicates that our planning may have been excessively dominated by concepts as to CIA's exclusive domain rather than by practical recognition as to what we probably can or should try to do in wartime. After several years of planning we have not yet seen an official CIA Global War Plan or any fully developed Theater War Plans. Support planning and preparation is dependent not only upon a clear concept of operations but upon a critical analysis of the quantitative, qualitative and phased requirements of those operations for services and material. The suggestion has been made that CIA could make more effective progress in actual war preparation if it made an appraisal independent of the formal war planning system as to what it could, should and most likely would be asked to do in wartime and proceeded to plan accordingly. Greater progress could then be made in actually developing a level of war preparedness. The results of such planning could subsequently be reflected in formal war planning documents.

C. The total war planning mechanism of CIA is not believed to be fully effective at the present time in uniting the planning efforts of the Senior War Planners abroad, the overseas Chiefs of Station, the Area Divisions, the Senior Staffs of the DD/P and the Planning Staffs of the DD/S. To develop unanimity of concept and to secure concerted action from so many officials in unrelated and dispersed command and staff capacities is, at best, a difficult task. The view has been expressed to me that satisfactory progress in war planning will never be achieved until full responsibility for such planning has been authoritatively centralized and a more effective mechanism developed to guide and direct the subordinate planning efforts of all components having related or contributory responsibilities.

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7. Regardless of the validity of any of the above opinions, it is a fact that up to the present time the support components have not been prepared to participate effectively in war planning and the mechanism has not been in existence which would permit them to do so. We are, therefore, principally engaged at the present time in the following:

A. Staffing and training the planning staffs of the DD/S components for wartime planning.

B. Staffing and training a DD/S Planning Staff to correlate the planning efforts of the individual support components and integrate these activities with those of the DD/P.

C. Developing understanding and working relationships with the War Plans Division, PFC, which will permit us to receive better knowledge and guidance in war planning and to participate more effectively in the development of the overseas war plans as well as our own domestic war plans.

Signed
L. K. WHITE
Deputy Director
(Support)

Attachments:

- TAB A: Headquarters Wartime Preparations
- TAB B: Overseas Wartime Preparations
- TAB C: Separate Reports from each Support Component

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